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OSAMA BIN LADEN
Born 1957 for
Syrian mother, Osama bin Laden was the seventh son among fifty brothers
and sisters.
His father
Mohammed Awad bin Laden came to the kingdom from Hadramout (South Yemen)
sometime around 1930. The father started his life as a very poor laborer
(porter in Jeddah port), to end up as owner of the biggest construction
company in the kingdom. During the reign of King Saud, bin Laden the
father became very close to the royal family when he took the risk of
building King Saud's palaces much cheaper than the cheapest bid. He
impressed King Saud with his performance but he also built good relations
with other members of the royal family, especially Faisal. During the Saud-Faisal
conflict in the early sixties, bin Laden the father had a big role in
convincing King Saud to step down in favor of Faisal. After Saud's
departure the treasury was empty and bin Laden was so supportive to King
Faisal that he literally paid the civil servants' wages of the whole
kingdom for six months. King Faisal then issued a decree that all
construction projects should go to bin Laden. Indeed, he was appointed for
a period as the minister of public works.
In 1969 the
father took the task of rebuilding Al-Aqsa mosque after the fire incident.
Interestingly the bin Laden family say that they have the credit of
building all the three mosques, because later on their company took over
the task of major extension in Mecca and Medina mosques.
The father was
fairly devoted Moslem, very humble and generous. He was so proud of the
bag he used when he was a porter that he kept it as a trophy in the main
reception room in his palace. The father used to insist on his sons to go
and manage some projects themselves.
The father had
very dominating personality. He insisted to keep all his children in one
premises. He had a tough discipline and observed all the children with
strict religious and social code. He maintained a special daily program
and obliged his children to follow. At the same time the father was
entertaining with trips to the sea and desert. He dealt with his children
as big men and demanded them to show confidence at young age. He was very
keen not to show any difference in the treatment of his children.
Osama was
exposed very early on his age to this experience but he lost his father
when he was 13. He married at the age of 17 to a Syrian girl who was a
relative. He grew up as religiously committed boy and the early marriage
was another factor of protecting him from corruption.
Osama had his
primary, secondary and even university education in Jeddah. He had a
degree in public administration 1981 from King Abdul-Aziz university in
Jeddah. Countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Sudan are the only countries he has been to. All stories of trips to
Switzerland, Philippines, and London are all unfounded.
In addition to
the general Islamic commitment he started forming an Islamic
responsibility at early age. His father used to host hundreds of pilgrims
during Hajj season from al over the world. Some of those were senior
Islamic scholars or leaders of Muslim movements. This habit went on even
after his father's death through his elder brothers. He used to make good
contacts and relations through those gatherings.
At secondary
school and university he adopted the main trend of many educated Muslims
at that time, Muslim Brotherhood. There was a collection of Muslim
scholars in Jeddah and Mecca at that period. There was nothing
extraordinary in his personality and that trend was rather very
non-confrontational. Interestingly, the 1980 raid in the Grand Mosque in
Mecca was not appealing to him, neither the theology or that group. He had
two distinguished teachers in Islamic studies, which was a compulsory
subject in the university. First was Abdullah Azzam who became later as
one of the big names in Afghanistan and the second was Mohammed Quttub, a
famous Islamic writer and philosopher.
The first
encounter with Afghanistan was as early as the first two weeks of Soviet
invasion. He went to Pakistan and was taken by his hosts Jamaat Islami
from Karachi to Peshawar to see the refugees and meet some leaders. Some
of those leaders like Rabbani and Sayyaf were common faces to him because
he met them during Hajj gatherings That trip which was [a] secret trip
lasted for almost a month and was an exploratory rather than action trip.
He went back to the kingdom and started lobbying with his brothers,
relatives and friends at the school to support the mujahedeen. He
succeeded in collecting huge amount of money and material as donations to
jihad. He made another trip to take this material. He took with him few
Pakistanis and Afghanis who were working in bin Laden company for more
than ten years. Again, he did not stay more than a month The trip was to
Pakistan and the border only and was not to Afghanistan. He went on
collecting money and going in short trips once or twice a year until 1982.
In 1982 he
decided to go inside Afghanistan. He brought with him plenty of the
construction machinery and put them at the disposal of the mujahedeen He
started spending more and more time in Afghanistan occasionally joining
actual battles but not in an organized manner. His presence was
encouraging to more Saudis to come but the numbers were still small at
that period.
In 1984 he had
one further step in strengthening his presence in Afghanistan by
establishing the guesthouse in Peshawar (Baitul'ansar). That house was
supposed to be the first station of Arab mujahedeen when they come to
Afghanistan before going to the front or start training. At that period
Osama did not have his own command or training camps. He used to send the
newcomers to one of the Afghan factions.
The guesthouse
establishment was coinciding with the formation of Jihad Service Bureau by
Abdullah Azzam in Peshawar. The Bureau was very active in terms of media,
publications and charity work. The Bureau publications were important in
attracting more Saudis and Arabs to Afghanistan.
In 1986
Osama decided to have his own camps inside Afghanistan and within two
years he built more than six camps. Some were mobilized more than once. He
decided to have his own front and to run his own battles with his own
command. Among the Arab fighters he had, there were senior Arab
ex-military men from Syria and Egypt with good military experience. The
story of the guesthouse and the camps was very attractive for more Arab
mujahedeen to come and there was a significant surge in their numbers at
that period.
In
addition to many exchanges of fire and small operations, the first major
battle he had face to face with the Soviet army with pure Arab personnel
was the battle of Jaji in the province of Baktia 200 kilometers away from
Khost. From then until 1989 he had more than five major battles with
hundreds of small operations and exchanges of fire. During the period
1984-1989 he was staying more in Afghanistan than Saudi Arabia. He would
spend a total of eight months a year or more in Afghanistan.
In 1988 he
noticed that he was backward in his documentation and was not able to give
answers to some families asking about their loved ones gone missing in
Afghanistan. He decided to make the matter much more organized and
arranged for proper documentation. He made a tracking record of the
visitors, be they mujahedeen or charity or simple visitors. Their movement
between the guesthouse and the camps had to be recorded as well as their
first arrival and final departure. The whole complex was then termed Al-Qa'edah
which is an Arabic word meaning "The Base." Al-Qa'edah was very much
public knowledge. It was funny to see some people triumphing because they
discovered it!
Late 1989
after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, he went to the kingdom in an
ordinary trip. There he was banned from travel and was trapped in the
kingdom. The Soviet withdrawal might have been a factor but the main
reason for the travel ban were his intentions to start a new "front" of
jihad in South Yemen. In addition, he embarrassed the regime by lectures
and speeches warning of impending invasion by Saddam. At that time the
regime was at very good terms with Saddam. He was instructed officially to
keep low profile and not to give public talks. Despite the travel ban he
was not hostile to regime at this stage. Indeed he presented a written
advice in the form of a detailed, personal, private and confidential
letter to the king few weeks before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
He reacted
swiftly to Iraqi invasion and saw it fulfilling his prophecy. He
immediately forwarded another letter to the king suggesting in detail how
to protect the country from potentially advancing Iraqi forces. In
addition to many military tactics suggested, he volunteered to bring all
the Arab mujahedeen to defend the kingdom. That letter was presented in
the first few days of the incident, and the regime response was of
consideration!
While he was
expecting some call to mobilize his men and equipment he heard the news
which transferred his life completely. The Americans are coming. He always
describes that moment as shocking moment. He felt depressed and thought
that maneuvers had to change. Instead of writing to the king or
approaching other members of the royal family, he started lobbying through
religious scholars and Muslim activists. He succeeded in extracting a
fatwah from one of the senior scholars that training and readiness is a
religious duty. He immediately circulated that fatwah and convinced people
to have their training in Afghanistan. It was estimated that 4000 went to
Afghanistan in response to the fatwah. The regime was not happy with his
activities so they limited his movement to Jeddah only. He was summoned
for questioning twice for some of his speeches and activities and was
given warnings. To intimidate him, the regime raided his farm in the
suburb of Jeddah by the National Guard. He was not there during the raid
and was very angry when told. He wrote a letter of protest to Prince
Abdullah. Abdullah apologized and claimed he is not aware and promised to
punish who ever were responsible.
Osama was
fed up with this almost house arrest situation and did not imagine himself
able to stay in the country with the American forces around. One of his
brothers was very close to King Fahad and also close to Prince Ahmed,
deputy minister of interior. He convinced his brother that he needed to
leave the country to sort out some business matters in Pakistan and come
back. There was a difficult obstacle, the stubborn Prince Nayef, minister
of interior. His brother waited until Nayef went in a trip outside the
kingdom and extracted lifting the ban from prince Ahmed. When he arrived
in Pakistan around April 1991 he sent a letter to his brother telling him
that he is not coming back and apologized for letting him down with the
royal family.
After his
arrival to Pakistan he went straight to Afghanistan because he knew the
Pakistani intelligence would hand him back to the Saudis. There, he
attended the collapse of the communist regime and the consequent dispute
between the Afghan parties. He spent great effort to arbitrate between
them but with no success He ordered his followers to avoid any involvement
in the conflict and told them it was a sin to side with any faction.
During his stay the Saudis tried more than once to kidnap or kill him in
collaboration with the Pakistani intelligence. His friends in the Saudi
and Pakistani establishments would always leak the plan and make him ready
for it. After his failure in sorting the Afghani dispute, he decided to
leave Afghanistan. The only alternative country he had was Sudan. He left
Afghanistan disguised in private jet only few months after his arrival.
That was late 1991.
His choice of
Sudan had nothing to do with jihad or "terrorism." He was attracted to
Sudan because of what was at that time an Islamic banner raised by the new
regime in Sudan. He wanted to have good refuge as well as help the
government in its construction projects. There was no intention from his
side or from the Sudanese regime to have any military activity in Sudan.
Indeed the Sudanese government refused even sending some of his followers
to the front in the south. He was treated in Sudan as a special guest who
wanted to help Sudan when everybody was turning away. In Sudan he
mobilized a lot of construction equipment and enrolled himself in busy
construction projects. He spent good effort in convincing Saudi
businessmen to invest in Sudan and had reasonable success. Many of his
brothers and Jeddah merchants had and still have investment in real
estate, farming and agricultural industry. In Sudan he had again escaped
an assassination attempt which turned out later to be the plan of Saudi
intelligence.
During his stay
in Sudan anti-American incidents happened in Somalia and South Yemen.
Neither of the two incidents was performed by his group in the proper
sense of chain of command. Both were performed by people who had training
in Afghanistan and had enough anti-American drive. He might have given
some sanctioning to the operations but one thing was certain, the Sudanese
were completely unaware of either.
Between his
arrival to Sudan and early 1994 he was not regarded publicly as Saudi
opposition and Saudi citizens were visiting him without too much
precautions. Only the well-informed people would know that he was
classified as enemy to the Saudi regime. His assets were frozen sometime
between 1992 and 1994 but that was not published. The Saudis decided to
announce their hostility early 1994 when they publicized withdrawing his
citizenship.
After long
silence and tolerance, bin Laden replied by issuing a communiqué
condemning the Saudi decision and saying that he does not need the "Saudi"
reference to identify himself and it is not up to Al-Saud to admit or
expel people from Arabian Peninsula. He then formed together with
activists and scholars from the kingdom a group called "Advice and Reform
Committee" (ARC). The ARC was, according to its communiqués and published
agenda, a purely political group. The ARC published around 17 communiqués
which might have contained harsh criticism of the Saudi regime and plenty
of religious rhetoric but never contained reference for violence or
incitment of violence.
The car bomb in
spring 1995 in Riyadh was the first major anti-American action in the
kingdom. Bin Laden never claimed responsibility, but the Saudi government
tried to link the incident to bin Laden by showing video confessions of
four "Arab Afghans" involved in the bombing.
Sudan was
exposed to huge international pressure for hosting bin Laden and his
followers, and bin Laden felt that he is becoming an embarrassment to the
Sudanese. Early in 1996 he started making contacts with his old friends in
Afghanistan to prepare for his reception. He fled Sudan in a very well
planned trip with many of his followers to go straight to Jalalabad in
Eastern Afghanistan.
When he
arrived there, the situation in Afghanistan was very unsettled between the
many factions, but he had very good relations with all factions and all
would protect him. The area he arrived to was under control of Yunis
Khalis, a very influential warlord who later on joined Taliban.
June 1996, after
his arrival in Afghanistan was the Khobar bombing. Nobody claimed
responsibility, but sources from inside the Saudi ministry of interior
confirmed involvement of Arab Afghans, with possible link to bin Laden The
Saudi government wanted to frame Shi'a, at the beginning but Americans
were very suspicious of the Saudi story. Bin Laden himself never claimed
responsibility but gave many hints that he might have been involved. The
Saudi government has acknowledged recently that bin Laden's men were
behind the bombing.
After few months
of his arrival he issued his first anti-American message, a Declaration of
War. That declaration was limited to expelling American forces outside the
Arabian Peninsula. His sense of security and nobody to embarrass must have
been the drive to release that 12 page declaration. Interest in him by the
Saudis never stopped and they tried very hard to convince Yunis Khalis to
hand him over, and he flatly refused despite the luxurious offers.
Taliban swept
Jalalabad late 1996, almost without war, and bin Laden came under their
control. He was optimistic that they will give him sanctuary but he was
not sure. He was surprised when a delegation of Taliban came to meet him
by order of Mullah Omer, the leader of Taliban, with instructions to
reassure him that he will have even better protection under Taliban. The
delegation expressed Taliban honor of protecting somebody like him who
sacrificed a lot for the sake of jihad.
The Saudis never
gave up. Early 1997 they bought some mercenaries in the Pakistani Afghani
border. The operation was arranged with the Pakistani intelligence. The
information leaked to bin Laden and he decided to move immediately to
Qandahar, the stronghold of Taliban. The operation was then cancelled.
When bin
Laden left Jalalabad, he ordered many of his followers to join Taliban in
their war against Dostum and to protect Kabul. The unexpected happened.
Taliban troops were fooled by a trap in the north and Kabul front was
exposed to Shah Masood. Taliban were so disorganized at that stage that it
was only those few Arabs who were there to push Shah Masood off Kabul and
they did efficiently.
The leader of
Taliban Mulla Omer was keen to meet Osama. He met him early 1997 after two
TV interviews, Channel 4 and CNN. Mulla Omer expressed respect and
admiration but requested him to have low profile. He stressed that that
was a request and not an order. Osama replied with appreciation and thanks
and reassured Mulla Omer that he was going very low profile.
Sometime
in late 1997 a big operation was planned by the Americans. The primary
plan was for American special forces to attack bin Laden's residence in
Qandahar and kidnap him in a commando style operation. The plan was mocked
in Pakistani desert and proved dangerous. While the Americans were
reconsidering the decision, the news leaked to bin Laden, again through
the Pakistani military, and he made it public. That was published in Al-Quds
Al-Arabi in London. The Americans had no choice but to cancel. Americans
acknowledged this incident only recently, but did not acknowledge the
leak.
Bin Laden
noticed that the driving force in Taliban were Ulema (religious scholars).
He made very good links with them and lobbied specifically for the subject
of American forces in the Arabian Peninsula. He was able to extract a
fatwah signed by some 40 scholars in Afghanistan sanctioning the use of
all means to expel the American forces from the Peninsula. The issue of
that fatwah was an asset to him inside Taliban domain. He felt that Ulema
were at his back and he can go high profile after long silence.
His second
presence in Afghanistan has attracted many mujahedeen to move there again.
Among those were Ayman El-Zawahery of Egyptian Jihad and Rift'ee Taha of
Jama'a Islamia. There was also new phenomenon during that period. Bin
Laden decided to go pan-Islamic instead of Saudi or Arabic. He attracted
Kashmiris, Pakistanis, Indians, and Muslims from the Soviet Republics. He
thought at that stage that he could make an international alliance against
America. In February 1998 he declared the formation of the International
Front. The declaration contained two elements, formation of the front and
a fatwah sanctioning killing Americans and Jews. Apart from two Arabic
newspapers, the declaration had minimal coverage by the press.
After avoiding
the media for almost a year he decided to open the door wide for them. In
April 1998 he received the ABC TV team and two weeks later he held press
conference in Khost and warned of impending attack in few weeks time.
Mulla Omer was not happy with this new media escalation, but felt it
difficult to control him while he is protected by the scholars. Indeed bin
Laden said that he would abide with what ever the Ulema board decides
The bombings in
Kenya and Tanzania July 1998 were not a big surprise. Yes, it was a
surprise but in terms of choice of location and targets. Despite his
declaration of war against America anywhere, the attack was expected
inside Saudi Arabia. Having said that, it is not [to be taken] for granted
that he is behind the bombing.
It is not known
why the Americans chose a camp in Khost to retaliate. The camp was an
almost deserted camp where only few Arabs have stayed, with a neighboring
camp of Kashmiris. Bin Laden himself was hundreds of miles away, and the
rest of Arab Afghans were in the northern front celebrating their recent
victories.
Since the
American attack bin Laden was put in heavy protection and advised to stay
hiding. His followers made another credit when they protected Kabul front
again and pushed Masood forces back.
Bin Laden
was brought up with good manners. He matured as extremely humble and very
generous person. He insists to join his comrades in every act. Very
frequently he cooks for them and serves them. He lives a simple life in a
small flat in Jeddah or in a shed in Afghanistan and insists on his family
to eat simple and to dress simple.
He is known to
be strictly truthful and would never lie, but he is politically conscious
and believes there is a room for political maneuver even if you are
devoted person. Despite being shy he has dominating personality. He speaks
very little and looks serious most of the time. He would appear with a
soft smile but he seldom laughs. His followers see a lot of aura on him
and show great voluntary respect to him. For some reason that falls short
of a proper charisma. He is not known for giving distinguished speeches,
and there is almost no audio or video recordings of him.
He is widely
educated and spends a good deal of time reading. He is fond of media
monitoring and information gathering and research. There was always a data
management team with him wherever he went.
Among the
outstanding features is his courage. He will not show a flicker even if a
bomb exploded near him. He was exposed to more than 40 incidents of heavy
bombardment, three of them were full of death and flesh around him. A Scud
missile exploded 17 meters distance from him. At one time he was almost
the victim of chemical weapons. More than once he needed treatment in
hospital for body injuries. Despite this courage he is very cautious
person. He would not keep any electronic instrument close to his vicinity.
Some times he even avoids any device even if it is a simple watch near him
because he believes this might help in targeting him.
He is
intelligent and has reasonable strategic thinking, but he downgrades
himself in the presence of Islamic scholars. He always admires Shiekh
Safar al-Hawali and would have not gone through his current controversial
path if al-Hawali was free. Some people saw him as a man with vision,
others doubt it. They think that he never had clear long term plan. They
see the last fatwah as evidence of that.
Contrary
to what is always reiterated bin Laden has never had official relations
with the Saudi regime or the royal family. All his contacts would happen
through his brothers. The brothers would approach two members of the royal
family who were fairly sympathetic to Osama. They were Ahmed bin Abdul
Aziz, deputy minister of interior and Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Aziz, deputy
minister of defense. He might have met them in few occasions but those
meetings would have been purely social or accidental in one of his
brother's houses. Specifically he had no relation with Turki al-Faisal
head of Saudi intelligence. He used to be very suspicious of his role in
Afghanistan and once had open confrontation with him in 1991 and accused
him of being the reason of the fight between Afghan factions. He was wary
of the Saudi government very early in the eighties, but he thought it was
wiser to keep silent and benefit from their de facto support to jihad in
that period.
Bin Laden
has never had any relation with America or American officials. Claims of
relation with CIA or other American departments are all unfounded. Since
the late seventies he had strong anti-American feeling. He committed
himself and family and advised all friends to avoid buying American goods
unless it was necessary. He was saying very early in the eighties that the
next battle is going to be with America. ... No aid or training or other
support have ever been given to bin Laden from Americans. Bin Laden would
bring money from individuals donating straight to him. The weapons he had
were either captured from the Soviets or bought from other factions.
Again there were
no official relations with officials in Pakistani government. However, he
had paramount respect by many Pakistanis including people in the army,
intelligence and religious establishment. They were so penetrating that
they would always leak any plan against him by the
Pakistani-Saudi-American alliance.
His relation
with Taliban would best be understood if Taliban themselves are understood
properly. First of all Taliban are not simply another Afghan faction
supported by Pakistan. Taliban are sincere to their beliefs, a religiously
committed group unspoiled by political tactics. They would never bargain
with what they see as matters of principle. Bin Laden for them is a saint.
He is a symbol of sacrifice for the sake of jihad. They see him as very
rich Arab from the Holy Land who gave up his wealth and luxury to fight
for the sake of his brother Muslims in Afghanistan. They see themselves
performing a double duty here, an Islamic duty of protecting this
distinguished person and a tribal duty of protecting a descent refugee.
The latter is a big value in Afghanistan. Once, a Taliban leader said to a
Saudi envoy that if a goat would seek refuge to my tent I would never hand
it over, how on earth do you want us to hand over a holy man like bin
Laden?
There was no
argument within Taliban about handing over bin Laden. There is however
some difference in opinion about how high his media profile should be.
In addition to
the factor of principle, bin Laden had twice had the credit of protecting
Kabul recently.
Bin Laden became
an intimate part of Taliban structure when he taught them how to deal with
state affairs in a proper manner. For example, they were to be fooled by
some oil and gas companies and sell the pipeline project for cheap. He
advised them to learn from the Iraq-Turkey and Iraq-Syria agreements. They
wanted to privatize some factories and were about to sell them to
Pakistani businessmen for cheap prices. He taught them how to conduct
proper bidding procedure and guarantee good prices.
It is
needless to say that bin Laden has not had any relation with Iran. Iran
knows that bin Laden is a committed Sunni and he regards Iran as Shi'a
state. The trust between the two is minimal but both have avoided
criticizing each other publicly. Having said that, he sees America as
common enemy and according to a Pakistani newspaper he regards an
anti-American alliance with Iran and China as something to be considered.
Bin Laden
has two circles of followers. First are the closed core followers who are
related to him by a chain of command and take orders like a secret
organization. Most of those are probably in Afghanistan. Many are inside
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia and probably Gulf countries. Like any secret
group, those followers would not disclose their relation. Inside Saudi
Arabia many of those would appear like any average citizen. The number of
those is probably in hundreds.
The second
circle is much wider and the number is probably in thousands. They are
located in the same countries. They would look at bin Laden as Godfather
but they do not have proper chain of command or secret links with him.
They would regard themselves obliged to perform some of his general
orders. Most of those followers are not organized and get trapped by the
Saudi police fairly easily. But some are intelligent and make use of the
loose nature of their structure to function without attracting attention.
Before his final
departure from Saudi Arabia, his financial activities were almost copies
of his brothers. Indeed, he is still part of the big mother company.
However he had committed himself at very early stage to a special code
which he thought was necessary to guarantee the Islamic nature of this
activity. For example he would never invest in non-Islamic country. He
would never use banks unless it was absolutely necessary. He does not
believe in stock market because he thought the investor cannot escape
interest since the money has to be in a bank and produce some interest. He
is also preoccupied with the idea that Jews control banks and stock
market.
He had three
setbacks which would have made him bankrupt otherwise. The first was the
freezing of his direct assets by the Saudi government. All his traceable
money was frozen including his share in the big mother company of bin
Laden. No body knows the exact amount but it was probably in the range of
200-300 million Dollars.
The second
setback was the loss he had in Sudan. The Sudanese government was too weak
financially to pay him for the construction projects and he ended up
hardly with 10% of the payment. He lost in Sudan not less than 150 million
dollars.
The third
setback happened last year when one of his close aids defected to the
Saudi government. The defector Sidi Tayyib Al-Madani had some financial
information about him until early 1995. Bin Laden knew about the plans of
this man to defect and so had few months to liquidate the few businesses
known to this defector. There was very little trace of those businesses
but dismantling them was not without loss.
There is,
however the other side of the story. Bin Laden is a member of a big
family. His father's financial inheritance has not been sorted. The
brothers agreed to keep many assets of the father and distribute the
profits only. Most of the brothers and sisters are observing Muslims and
very keen not to "spoil" their income with money which is not theirs. They
believe it is their duty to let the owner of any riyal to have it. The
only way they guarantee that is by letting bin Laden's share reach him.
Some of the brothers and sisters believed it was their religious duty to
support this distinguished brother from their own money. While many are
very careful not to irritate the royal family, many more do not care and
insist on letting the money reach Osama.
The way bin
Laden family money is structured is very complicated because there is the
big company and there are many small companies of few brothers together,
and there are many individuals with their personal investment. To make the
matter even more complex it is very well known that bin Laden family money
is intimately mixed with the royal family money in a very complex way.
Most of the companies are joint ventures with members of the royal family
including King Fahad himself.
There is another
big source of income to bin Laden, donations. During the early jihad era
when it was blessed by the Saudi regime, he made excellent relations with
many wealthy Saudis and Arabs. It is true that most of those would not
support him now because of the Saudi government position but some do take
the risk.
Lastly, bin
Laden activities are not very dependent on money. His followers are not
mercenaries. Training does not cost a lot of money. Explosives and weapons
are very cheap in some parts of the world. In Somalia TNT for example is
cheaper than sugar. In Yemen you can buy an RPG for less than TV set. The
role of money here is over exaggerated by many writers.
In the eighties
bin Laden was seen as a star of the Afghan Jihad. He was very much admired
and respected for his sacrifice but he was not seen as a potential leader.
Almost nobody saw leadership ambitions in him at that period. His public
image was so good that the regime used this image to have a boost during
early days of the Gulf War. The regime published a fabricated interview
with him in "Al-Muslimoon" newspaper claiming he supported the regime
measures to counteract the Iraqi invasion.
In the period
between Iraqi invasion and his reappearance in Afghanistan 1996 he was
almost forgotten by the public. The elite and especially the jihadis were
still admiring him and following up his news. Some even made their way to
Sudan to meet him and offer support. The public were reminded about him by
the video confessions of the group attributed to Riyadh bombing.
After his
declaration of jihad in 1996 his public image had a surge but this time as
a leader rather than a star. There was a lot of controversy about him. In
Saudi Arabia nobody would accuse him of being part of conspiracy but
people would differ about his new program. There was almost a consensus in
the Saudi domain on refusal of American presence in Arabia and many would
like the idea of expelling the Americans by force. Many others had
reservations and thought violence will bring a lot of trouble to the
country. Interestingly those who disagreed with him did not accuse him
having personal agenda or looking for personal benefits.
This image went
on with occasional boosts by the media until the African bombings.
Interestingly the story of the International Front and fatwah did not
attract much attention. The Kenya Tanzania bombings reminded people of bin
Laden. The media coverage was so overwhelming that the Saudi authorities
felt jealous of bin Laden. People's reaction, however, was mixed. While
many felt triumph for scaring the Americans, many others felt upset by the
picture of hundreds of civilians killed and injured in the attack. They
felt that this can never be justified.
The
American missiles then played very strong role in sorting the controversy.
After the American attack on Sudan and Afghanistan it became almost
shameful to criticize bin Laden. People inside Saudi Arabia and in other
Arab countries were full of anger towards America, and whoever can
antagonize America would provide a fulfillment to their desire of
discharging their anger. The American strike with the associated remarks
by Clinton and American officials proved that bin Laden is a big challenge
to America. In the mind of average Arab and Muslim bin Laden appeared as
the man who was able to drive America so crazy that it started shooting
haphazardly at unjustified targets. There was another factor which made
people forget the scene of civilian victims, the special nature of the
Sudanese factory. Those who had reservations of the African bombings
thought that this arrogance of the Americans is much worse than the
embassy bombings. Their view was that while bin Laden or others can make
"executive" mistake because of their difficult circumstances, logistics
and communication, America is not supposed to do this mistake unless it is
done in purpose.
Interestingly
the jealousy of the Saudi regime was seen clearly in the Saudi media when
they instructed the Saudi TV and radio not to mention bin Laden name at
all. Even when they reported the American missile attack the news item was
" attack on terrorist base in Afghanistan, period".
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